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4 August 1965

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[redacted]

In the words of Billy Rose, "I was underwhelmed" by the DD/I's argument this morning. Also, my feelings were hurt because it seemed clear that at least [redacted] figures that I should stick to adding up budget numbers and refrain from interjecting opinions into the discussions. (By the way, I know less about budget than I do about interjecting.)

The situation did give me pause for reflection, since I have never been sure whether I am a BPAM member of the PG, the Executive Secretary's boss, half-ass scribe or the man who came to dinner. However, this only bothers me when I feel that I have talked too much, so don't let it bother you.

To avoid talking too much again, perhaps the brief notice of reminder which follows can be thrown into your internal ADP mechanism:

"Since we may have gone around our backside to reach our elbows in the preparation of the plan, it is believed that particular attention will have to be given to ensuring that the "major problems" described in the narrative portion of the report are backed up by logical and fairly concrete programs; that these programs indicate the general level of resources required (people, money, things), and that significant relationships of programs be shown. For example, if you say that it is quite clear that

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practically every aspect of intelligence will require the application of ADP techniques over the next ten years, you must also in some terms say what particular aspects will be worked on with the first five-year period (this has been agreed to). My point is that the plan must go one step farther: in the "programs" portion of the plan we should be expected to show the ADP programs which should be carried out, their general cost, the estimated time at which results are to be obtained, and their relationship to other programs."

Second, it seems that the meeting ended before it was decided just what monographs the DD/I would prepare -- in fact, the DD/I guys may feel that their construction of the list of "major problems" was not completed. Based on this morning's discussion, it appears the DD/I believes that monographs should be written on: DD/I organization; Processing; Current intelligence/early warning; Systems analysis; Role of CIA; Personnel policy/training; The intelligence research and production process. (Taken from my notes).

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1. Intelligence Objectives - Perhaps not strangely, OCI, ONE and ORR come up with different intelligence objectives. Only ORR went all the way with the PNIOs. Should the Planning Group have uniformity here? Should it write PNIOs? Recommend they be rewritten in view of their pertinence to future planning efforts.

2. Political Research - ORR and OCI suggest external research in the political field (and in the economic field). In fact, it is suggested that a "CIA research proprietary institute" be established. On the other hand, [ ] Research Staff believes all research should be "within the Government."

(Could the OBI political research be done on contract?)

3. Current Intelligence - OCI suggests a very full 24-hour current intelligence operation. It sounds like a sound and perhaps inevitable development, but doesn't it mean that ORR and OSI must also do this? Otherwise, OCI must provide all these skills (i. e., scientific and economic) within its house. The question of 24-hour current intelligence has wide ramifications.

OCI also makes the point that computer-based information programs will be required for current intelligence production. Are the current intelligence needs this unique, or can OCI feed off of a generalized program?

Why a 100% increase in Operation Center by 1975 -- Why a 500% commo increase in support?

4. Military Intelligence - Both OCI and ORR mention the need for increased research/analytic effort on military subjects. Does the Agency get deeper into this field also? Why does ORR need a significant increase on USSR military programs at this point in history?

(By the way, OCI says China will supplant the USSR as the main intelligence target.)

5. Research on the US - The Research Staff points up the need for research on US actions and policies as a prerequisite for understanding foreign actions -- this is interesting. Furthermore, it says that we really only research "in depth" the policies and actions of a very small number of foreign countries (USSR, China, Cuba) and overlook other important ones such as Germany.

6. Economic Intelligence - Why does ORR need more effort on the Soviet Bloc economy at this point in history?

7. CIA History - Research Staff suggests that CIA's history during the Cold War period should be done.

8. Recruitment and Training - The DD/I thinks that its analysts should have overseas experience and suggests a sizeable rotation plan with the DD/P. This is an old chestnut, but it will have to be roasted once again.

It is suggested that Personnel get more recruiters in order to increase the Agency's hiring of professional employees -- that academic training of professionals be a major policy -- that we hire undergraduates and provide for completion of their training -- that there be a broad program of professional seminars -- that CIA allow scholars (not in Federal employment) to use our information repositories in performing academic research, because of paucity of unclassified data and increasing areas of classified data.

9. Communications - The use of modern equipment for automatic dissemination of field material to the analysts desks is proposed. (NSA now does this.) However, we have DD/P security problems which have never allowed this. It seems like a logical development despite this.

10. Human Assets (and their relationship to "things") - The Research Staff pleads for the Agency to remember the value of the human mind -- for it to nurture "eggheads"; it points out that the ratio of money for things vs. people is already bad.

Also, the point is made that the Agency must have a "systems analysis" -- e. g., the development of technical collection devices must include what we will do with what we get and the total impact on all stages from collection through production -- we must also assess in advance the relationship of system to system in terms of priority, cost, and value.

11. New Uses of Old Skills - OCS suggests the further extension of economic analysis into the "predictive" area; based on the knowledge that economic factors frequently dictate political actions.

12. Coordination - It is proposed that a means be established provide a continuing exchange of information on Agency long-term programs -- that a permanent planning group be established.

- that a Commerce/State computer file of economic information on less-developed foreign areas be established.

13. Bureaucracy - The question is asked if the Defense Department will ultimately become the US "Department of Foreign Affairs?"

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14. Geographic intelligence and mapping - OBI makes a good case for considerable expansion in geographic intelligence for purposes such as: environmental studies for counterinsurgency and covert operations; the coming struggle for the earth's land and sea resources (including competition for arctic regions); targeting of reconnaissance, etc. However, OBI also bases the need on supporting legal traveler observations in the USSR which seems a slender reed in light of [ ] [ ] remarks.

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The point is made that R&D into color reproduction in photography and mapping should be emphasized since private firms are not pushing this area very hard.

The need for research into "automated cartography" is also mentioned.

15. Requirements for Photography - Instead of the question which I asked you, OBI states its belief that consumers do not need all information which photography is capable of providing. (A very sophisticated requirements job is necessary here in terms of targets, detail of targets, color, resolution, interpretation, etc.)

16. Basic Intelligence - According to OBI the Community trend is once again toward departmental production of special-purpose basic intelligence. This will have an adverse effect in the NIS program and in making effective use of Community resources.

As in geographic intelligence, para. 14 above, it is mentioned that the Government's need for Basic Intelligence will increase. Additional reasons are given such as: an increase in the number of denied areas and the development of new technical collection techniques which will require a better knowledge of basic facts about geography and "things."

17. Collection Guidance Staff - CGS presents a number of sizeable objectives for itself in the requirements field -- i.e., "to play an effective role in the development of technical collection .... systems"; "to provide Community-coordinated guidance ..."; "...the precise and efficient targeting and scheduling of missions (reconnaissance)..."; "to increase the responsiveness of airborne reconnaissance systems ...". It is hard to see how CGS can achieve these objectives in view of its organizational position and questionable "statutory" origins.

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While not stated by CGS, the old problem is once again raised of whether or not this Agency or the Community needs a top-level requirements /priority mechanism. If so, where is it to be located and what is its mission. Several other problems raised in the Planning Group's deliberations bear on this problem.

OCR

18. Flow of Information - OCR predicts a flow of one million documents a year by 1970 and 1½ million by 1980!

19. Info Processing - In addition to the usual commentary about ADP, etc., it is pointed out that:

a. large training and retraining programs will be required for conversion to automation;

b. there will be a requirement for increased cooperation between USIB and non-USIB agencies in order to achieve maximum effectiveness in info systems;

c. it is OCR's goal to respond to priority information requests within 30 minutes by 1970 and within 10 minutes by 1980, and to deliver a copy of any document in 10 minutes;

d. Beginning in the early 1970s, OCR will begin wide personnel reductions due to gains in automation, which might reach, for example:

<u>Function</u>	<u>Decreases in personnel</u>
Graphics Files	15-20%
Report dissemination	75%
Publication procurement	50%


e. Beginning in 1970, OCR will place the indexing, storage and retrieval of all information under one automated system. This will be 25% completed by 1967-68, 65% by 1968-69 and 100% by 1969-70;

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f. The problem of information processing which now and in the future faces the Community makes it clear that this function is of great importance and should no longer be considered as a low priority matter -- it must get a better share of the money and resources available and the time of executives. STATSPEC



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21. I see nothing here which should take much of the Group's time.



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Substantive Assumptions

- A. The principal antagonists of the US will be the USSR and Communist China.
- B. Other Communist countries will be generally hostile to the US, and aligned, with varying degrees of firmness, either to the USSR or to Communist China.
- C. The nations of Western Europe, plus Australia, New Zealand, and Canada will remain basically friendly to the US in the major confrontation with Communist states, though there will be occasional conflicts of interest between them and the US.
- D. Most other countries of the world -- especially the "underdeveloped" countries -- will be unstable to varying degrees in their domestic affairs and their international alignments. The attitudes and action of even the weakest of these states may, according to circumstance, be of importance to US security.
- E. Nuclear war, involving the US, will remain a possibility during the period of this Plan.
- F. Non-nuclear wars, limited wars, wars of national liberation, and armed rebellions will occur from time to time in various areas. Most of these conflicts will involve US interests, to some degree; some of them will threaten US security interests, some will involve US armed forces.

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DATE

OFFICER'S  
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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1.

Mr. Clarke

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Good show. You  
"speak" for BPAW  
(PA) and a much  
longer a voice on  
programs. Budget  
review, if it comes,  
will be better. I  
trust you know this.  
If I were there - I'd  
take an active role  
- your sensitive  
vision is growing up.

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